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ANGLO-AMERICAN LA W RE VIEW

CONSERVATION, CONTROL AND HERITAGE PUBLIC LAW AND PORTABLE ANTIQUITIES

ByG.J. BENNETT* and C.M. BRAND**
The authors wish to acknowledge the generous assistance and advice given
them by Charles Sparrow QC,Henry Cleere (Director of the Council for
British Archaeology), and Brian Lang (Secretary to the Trustees of the
National Heritage Memorial Fund), all of whom also made valuable comments
on an earlier draft of this article.

"There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing
unto the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory."
With this quotation from Sir Francis Drake begins the first Annual
Report of the Trustees of the National Heritage Memorial Fund:
HMSO July 22, 1981. The Report details the development of the
fund, which was brought into existence by the National Heritage
Act, 1980, from its inception on March 31, 1980. The range of
activities undertaken by the Fund, covering as it does the raising of
Kin, Henry VIII's ill-fated warship "Mary Rose," the preservation
of the Dryden family home, Canons Ashby, and a grant to the Rifle
Brigade Museum to purchase the medals of one of its first company
commanders, Lieut-General Sir Thomas Beckwith, which were
auctioned at Sotherby's on November 26, 1980, reflects the scope of
the Trustees understanding of the national heritage. As the Trustees
themselves observed: "The national heritage of this country is
remarkably broad and rich. It is simultaneously a representation of
the development of aesthetic expression and a testimony to the role
.played by the nation in world history... But this national heritage is
constantly under threat." Part of that threat is lack of adequate legal
provision for the protection, conservation and control of portable
antiquities' . In this article we propose to examine the nature of that
threat and to indicate those areas where reform is essential.
One of the difficulties that stand in the way of a comprehensive
rethinking of the contribution of the law in this area is that hitherto
it has scarcely been considered to be an identifiable area at all.
While provision has been made over the years for the protection and
acquisition by public authorities of land and buildings of historic
interest, mainly through the provisions of the Town and Country
*MA, Barrister, Lecturer in Law in the University of Leeds.
* LLB, Solicitor. Lecturer in Law in the University of Liverpool.
NB: The order in which the authors' names appear does not signify a greater contribution to
the article by the first named.
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Planning legislation and culminating most recently in the Ancient
Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979, the protection of
individual moveable items which might be recovered from such
property has not fared so well. Such law as exists is spread amongst
a multifarious array of statutes and common law principles which
have emerged in a piecemeal and almost random manner. Because
of this, not only is the law out of touch with modern conditions,
but lawyers and laymen alike may fail to appreciate that the cultural
heritage reflected in the tangible remains of the past is a concept
that demands attention and requires protection.
In what follows, an attempt has been made to examine critically
the web of law relating to portable antiquities not only for its
intrinsic interest, but also because an awareness of the current state
of the law must be the starting point for any reform and codification.
To obtain a realistic appreciation of the present situation it is
necessary initially to examine the civil and criminal law relating to
the protection of portable antiquities in their immediate context; to
discuss recent developments in the law relating to their conservation
and the availability of funds, and finally restrictions on trade in
antiquities. Accordingly, after considering topics broadly raised by
treasure trove, and by the protection of ancient sites and monuments,
it is proposed to discuss the National Heritage Act 1980, and the
export restrictions which to some extent control trade in antiquities.
Treasure trove
The obscurity of the origins of the law of treasure trove is a fitting
back-drop to its present irrationality. Under Roman Law there was
a principle of Thesauri Inventio,2 but there seems no discernible link
between this and the English Law. Blackstone appears to refer the
King's right to treasure trove to the same original as the prerogative
right to mines of gold and silver. In the Case of Mines3 the basis of the
latter right was picturesquely described as turning upon the fact,
inter alia, that:
"ITihe common law, which is founded upon reason, appropriates every thing
to the persons whom it best suits, as common and trivial things to the common
people, things of more worth to persons in a higher and superior class, and
things most excellent to those persons who excell all other; and because gold
and silver are the most excellent things which the soil contains, the law has
appointed them (as in reason it ought) to the person who is the most excellent,
and that is the King.'4

There is perhaps more to be said for the suggestion that the availability of hoards of treasure might provide the "sinews of war" for a
person other than the King, or enable a subject to undermine the
currency by converting the precious metal into coin. Whatever the
appeal of all or any of these considerations in the past, none of them
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would seem to provide an adequate justification now for such a law.
The present law relating to treasure trove seems to be based on
Bracton and a surprisingly small number of reported cases.5 A passage which has received general approval as being a correct description of the law is also to be found in Chitty's Prerogatives of the
Crown (1820) at p. 182, where it is stated:
Treasure trove is where any gold or silver in coin or plate or bullion is found
concealed in a house or in the earth, or other private place, the owner thereof
being unknown, in which case the treasure belongs to the King or his grantee,
having the franchise of treasure trove.

More simply, there are three conditions which need to be satisfied
before a find is considered treasure trove, namely that:
I.

the articles are of gold or silver;

2.

the ownership is unknown;

3. the object(s) was hidden in the ground or in a building with the intention of
subsequent recovery.6

The Overton case
In March 1975 some 7,811 third century coins were found in a field
at Coleby in Lincolnshire. In the course of the case to which the find
gave rise, Attorney Generalof the Duchy of Lancasterv G.E. Overton Farns
Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 503 at p. 506e, Dillon J commented:
"The position ...in which the preservation for the nation of recently discovered
antiquities depends on a prerogative which originated for quite different
purposes is not satisfactory and the topic is one which could well merit the
attention of Parliament so as to adopt criteria in keeping with modern thinking
and the ways of modern life."

It is disappointing to reflect that much the same thing had been
said nearly 80 years previously by William Martin observing that:
"The present condition of the law is scarcely adapted to the needs and requirements of the present age; in fact, the old law should be labelled and relegated to..
the shelf of bygones in company with peine forte etdure, trial by battle and
deodand": see op. cit., n. 5 at p. 2 7 .

The remarks by Dillon J in the case are given added weight by the
fact that since the coins were held not to be treasure trove, any
certainty of conserving the find for the benefit of the nation was lost.
'There is thus raised the whole problem of the law's response to the
preservation, conservation and control of portable antiquities, of
which the law relating to treasure trove is only one small and clearly.
:inadequate part.
What seemed a pious hope in 1904 is now however a matter of
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more immediate concern. Never before, perhaps, has there been
such a keen interest in the remains of the past, and never before has
our capacity for obliterating them been greater. The ravages of
development or uncontrolled interference with ancient sites could
inestimably reduce the richness of our heritage for future
generations. The damage once done can be irreversible.
This case provides an- excellent illustration of the problems
involved in the law, and has been examined in detail by Professor
Palmer.7 There are however aspects of the discussion with which
one may respectfully disagree, and other matters which can
usefully be considered further. The court was faced with two
questions: was the right to treasure trove limited to articles of gold
and silver even when coins are concerned? If the Crown's rights
were so limited what were the criteria to be applied in deciding
whether a coin is a silver coin? The learned judge at first instance
and the Court of Appeal subsequently ([19821 2 WLR, 397) after a
careful review of the authorities held (1) that the prerogative right
was limited to articles of gold and silver, and therefore excluded coins
made of other metals; (2) whether an object was made of silver was a
question for the judge of fact to decide. Since the evidence in this
case showed the silver content to vary between 0.2 per cent and in
one case 18 per cent, but most coins falling within the range 5.85 per
cent to 0.2 per cent, the coins could not be regarded as silver. The
Duchy's claim of treasure trove therefore failed, and its attempt to
secure the coins for the benefit of the state proved abortive.
It is difficult to feel quite the same confidence that Professor
Palmer has that no objection can be made to the decision. Although
the conclusion of Dillon J and Lord Denning MR in the Court of
Appeal that treasure trove embraces only articles of gold and silver is
certainly supported by a diversity of references in legal writings.
the opposite is suggested by the earliest authorities. Glanvill' in
discussing the offence of concealing treasure trove mentions 'aliquod
genus metal/i.' Bracton refers to 'argentum vel aurum vel ,liud genus
metalli' and a little later in the same passage to 'quaedem vetus depositio
pecuniae vel alterius metali.' Neither author suggests that the prerogative
is limited to gold and silver. The Attorney General relied on the
9
definition in Blackstone's Commentaries that treasure trove was:
Where any money or coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion is found hidden in the
earth, or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown; in which case
the treasure belongs to the King.

Again it is quite clear that money was not limited to gold or silver.
Sir Edward Coke's definition'0 was slightly different:
Treasure trove is where any gold or silver, in coin, plate or bullyon hath been of
ancient time hidden.
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Dillon J regarded the passage from Blackstone as "no more than
a synthesis of Bracton and Coke... without independent support."
Lord Denning MR tersely commented: "So far as I can see Blackstone's view did not prevail."
The passages need not, however, be regarded as irreconcilable.
Doubtless the attention of the authorities was always likely to be
greater in valuable metals, and therefore it was in that area that
treasure trove was important. Is it not possible that Coke was
merely stating the current significance of treasure trove, rather than
saying what the law always had been? If this is correct then Bracton,
Glanvill and Blackstone are all of one view, and Coke's definition is
not necessarily inconsistent with it. It is difficult to place much
weight on arguments from silence, but no-one seems hitherto to
have suggested that Blackstone's view was actually incorrect, and
the limited case law does not compel an opposite view. Hardly
surprising then is Martin's view that:
"There is much to be said for the view that treasure trove is not restricted to the
precious metals merely.""

Dillon J's decision on the second issue, "that the question
whether a particular coin or object is of silver is for the judge of
fact to decide as best he can on all the evidence, without being
bound by any hard and fast rule or fixed percentage of silver
content," was refined and slightly modified by the Court of Appeal.
Lord Denning MR stated that the only test applicable was that,
"there must be a substantial amount of gold in the object. or a
substantial amount of silver. It will be for the coroner's jury to decide
this question: what is substantial?". On the meaning of "substantial"
reference was made to the Rents Acts case of Palser v Grinling,
Property Holding Co. Ltd v Mischeff [1948] AC291. Viscount Simon
there commented that: "it must be left to the discretion of the judge
of fact to decide as best he can according to the circumstances in
each case..." and that the laying down of percentage values would
be wrongly, "to play the part of the legislator." The whole thrust
of this statement which the Master of the Rolls quoted with such
approval is therefore to leave the matter to the discretion of the
tribunal of fact. Unfortunately, Lord Denning then appears seriously
to undermine the approach he advocates by making the obiter statement that: "It should, I think, be 50 per cent or more gold or silver
before it could be described as a gold or silver object."
Although it seems to run counter to the approach of Palser v Grinling
and the apparent approval of this principle in Overton, it is difficult to
resist the suspicion that Lord Denning's reference to the figure of 50
per cent will result in it being widely regarded as the dividing line
between objects of gold and silver and base metals. Such an approach
would be both unduly restrictive and wrong in principle. There
seems much to be said for Dillon J's original formulation which at
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least appeared to give somewhat greater latitude for a tribunal
sympathetic to the idea of preserving a find for the nation to decide
that the percentage of noble to base metal rendered the article
'gold" or "silver."
There is some authority, however, for a slightly stricter view of the
matter which was apparently overlooked by the court of first instance
and only cursorily referred to (for the purposes of dismissal) by the
Court of Appeal. Dillon J at least made some reference to the
Crown's prerogative to treasure trove being related to the King's
right to mines.
It seems quite clear from the Case of Mines (1567) 1 Plowd, 310
that the fact that land was not worked predominantly as a gold or
silver mine would not by itself exclude the Crown's interest. The
position was summarized by Lindley LJ when he stated in AttorneyGeneralv Morgan [1891] 1 Ch.432 at p.4 5 5:
"if metalliferous ores contained gold or silver to such an extent as to be worth
extracting and if such ores could not be obtained without interfering with
such gold or silver, the whole of such ores belonged to the Crown; and the
Crown had the right to work not only gold and silver mines, but also other
mines containing gold and silver worth extracting."

It was the harshness of this rule that was the whole point of the
statutes 1 Wm. & M. c. 30 and 5 Wm. & M. c. 6, which were intended to encourage the exploitation of minerals that might otherwise
be left untapped or even concealed for fear of the intrusion of the
prerogative right. Thus the position at common law appears to have
been that in respect of mines, the gold and silver content had to be
significant, but need not be so great as to be the cause of the mine's
operation. If the analogy can legitimately be extended to treasure
trove, then it would seem here also that the silver content in a silver
coin need not predominate to render the coin silver within the
prerogative's right to treasure trove. This would appear to point to a
generous interpretation of an object as being of "gold" or "silver."
Whilst one may wonder whether a silver content of 0.2 per cent,
quite apart from the maxim de minimis non curat lex, could be sufficient to allow it to be declared treasure trove, would it really be so
unreasonable to ascribe this status to an object the silver content of
which was, say. 15 per cent? It is a matter fOr regret that the Court
(d Appcal flillctl adequately to examine this possibility in its
iu<.'iclit.

Other criticisms
As Professor Palmer points out (see n. 7) the law of treasure trove is
quiLti iadclqciate to protect the great range of portable antiquities of
high historical interest. The limitation to gold and silver which
Ozrr/on ,at lcast adopted necessarily excldes perhaps the majority of
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historical artefacts. The requirement that the goods should be
hidden with the intention of eventual retrieval on the one hand
appears to exclude, for example, articles buried in graves, on the
other it may involve an inquiry into the mental state of an unknown
person, at an unknown time in totally uncertain and unknowable
personal circumstances. To adopt the words of Farwell J in A-G v
Trustees of the British Museum ([1903] 2 Ch. 598, at p. 610) such an
inquiry might be characterised as being full of, "fanciful suggestions more suited to the poem of a Celtic bard than the prose of an
English law reporter." To assist the discharge of this weighty but
highly speculative burden the courts seem to have developed a
rather artificial presumption in favour of the animus revertendi.
Where the articles are valuable, Farwell J at least took the view that
abandonment was unlikely, and together with the careful arrangement of the articles in that case, the Crown had made out a prima
facie case. The defendants had then to achieve the almost impossible
task one would have thought of proving a better title. Thus the
absurdity of the law's requirement is relieved by what is virtually an
.equally dubious fiction.
Once a find has been declared treasure trove the actual object is
likely to find its way to the British Museum. It is also the practice
of the Crown to pay the finder a reward equivalent to the market
value of the article: Brodrick Report, Cmnd 4810, para. 13, 23.
The award is entirely discretionary although it seems that it is only
reduced or withheld
when there has been an attempt at concealment
12
by the finder
What seems at first sight somewhat surprising is that is is the
finder rather than (if different) the landowner who is entitled to
what may be a very substantial reward. In the past when discoveries were likely to be entirely accidental and therefore perhaps
relatively rare, this may have been a tolerable state of affairs. With
the advent of cheap and readily obtainable metal detectors and the
rapidly growing hobby of "treasure hunting" the position is radically altered. It is now not unknown for people deliberately to seek
out and trespass upon an archaeologically "promising area." Is it
still appropriate that any reward should go to the finder? There is
much to be said for some modification of this state of affairs. Quite
apart from what might be seen as the element of onesidedness in the
arrangement, the knowledge that a landowner had some financial
stake in activities carried out on his land might encourage more care
in permitting (or keeping out) persons from using that land. It has
been suggested by Sparrow, QC, that a landowner might sue the
finder of treasure trove on his land in trespass. The measure of
damages, instead of being nominal, could then be assessed as the
reward value of the articles found. Professor Palmer (see n. 7 at
p. 185) has advanced the view that the landowner's possessory title
to the goods might also found an action. So far as is known, neither
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of these suggestions has been tested in the courts, and it is perhaps
unsatisfactory that the landowner should be obliged to indulge in a
potentially costly course of litigation.
A further practical dilemma is the position of the archaeologist
who discovers treasure trove in the course of an excavation. Some
play has been made of this occurrence in the propaganda war raged
between those advocating the use of metal detectors, and those
opposed to their use. Although it may not be as great a problem as
the former body of people might like to suggest, it could clearly
benefit from a clear and unambiguous answer. Whatever the precise
relationship between an individual -excavator and the supervising
authority or owner of the land, it would now seem prudent to introduce some contractual provision to ensure the ultimate destination
of any reward is made clear from the outset. This would help to
alleviate any suggestion of unjust enrichment against individuals
engaged in bona fide archaeological excavations.
Non-treasure trove items
When the coroner's finding is that an article does not come within
the ambit of treasure, then the general civil law indicates that title to
the goods is vested in the landowner.1 3 Yet there is an anomaly in
the operation of the law eyen in this area in that it is the practice of a
coroner's inquest when a find is not held to be treasure trove to
declare who is the owner of the articles: see Brodrick Report,
Cmnd 4810, para. 13, 23.Although such a decision as to ownership
is open to challenge in the civil courts, it seems strangely inappropriate that a coroner's inquest should be involved in this task. It
seems that an alleged misunderstanding of the impact of coroners'
decisions (clearly of no authoritative value) on the civil law was one
of the background considerations which led to an acquittal on the
basis of a lack of "dishonesty" in the case of R v Fletcher. 4 Since
both antiquarian interest and financial value are independent of the
fact that an article is not made of gold or silver, surely this area of
jurisdiction should be removed from coroners' courts altogether and
be left to the established civil courts with expertise in unravelling the
often complex intricacies of title to goods?
Reform of treasure trove Act
In 1979 Lord Abinger introduced an Antiquities Bill into the House
of l. nrds. Its failure to receive detailed consideration arose from the
fict that the Bill formally lapsed with the fall of the Labour
adininistration. An amended Bill was introduced in 1981 but having
failed to pass its final stages by the end of the second parliamentary.
scssion in 1982 also for'mally lapsed. There must be some doubt as to
weit her having failed on two separate occasions to become law, the
Billillll be introlucedl again in identical form. Nevertheless it
tcinis (lie only attempt to (late to effect any statutory reform, and
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it seems likely that even a subsequent and modified Bill will at least
be drafted with similar aims in mind. The aims of the Bill were to
have been achieved by two significant reforms: (1) the widening of
the class of objects which fall within the definition of treasure trove,
and (2) provision for the creation of a new category of specifically
protected classes of object.
Its most important clause provided:
1. After the coming into force of this Act the law of treasure trove shall
operate with the following amendments:
(1) Treasure trove shall comprise not only gold and silver but also any object
which is:
(a) made of any alloy containing gold or silver; or
(b) lying with or adjacent to a treasure trove object; or
(c) contained in any class of object specified by order made under this
subsection for the protection of portable antiquities by the Secretary
of State.
(2)

It shall no longer be necessary to establish that an object was hidden

with a view to recovery.

Although the change produced in the law by such a provision might
be considered the minimum possible reform, the Bill was a positive
proposal that would have gone a considerable way to rationalize and
clarify the law.
The need for the inevitably speculative and arguably pointless
inquiry into the animus revertendi was eliminated by cl. 1(2). Clause
1(1)(a) broadened the category of objects by including "any alloy
containing gold or silver." This seems particularly helpful as gold
and silver invariably occur in an impure form or mixed with other
metals. One of the further failures of the present law is that in
finding say, a jar of coins, the coins could be declared treasure
trove, and the pot revert to the finder or landowner. Hence cl. I (1)(b)
ensures that this anomaly is not perpetuated by bringing within the
sphere of protection adjacent objects. Whilst it would certainly
include the pot in the above example, there is obvious scope for
disagreement as to how much further it might extend."5 It is difficult
to envisage, however, an alternative form of drafting which would
be both efficacious and give rise to fewer difficulties. Clause
1(1)(c) contained within it the seeds of a radical and far-reaching
development. By enabling the class of objects protected by the
classification "treasure trove" to be widened by statutory instrument,
a variety of currently excluded items (such as ceramics and documents for example) could be gradually brought within the Crown's
domain. The result could be a comprehensive code of protection for
all portable antiquities, but achieved at a speed and in a manner
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acceptable to all parties involved. Clause 3 provided an offence for'
failure to report a find of property falling within cl. 1, and enjoined
the finder, "so far as practicable leave such property undisturbed."
This would clearly further protect archaeological sites from
depredations. Surprisingly perhaps, the prerogative right of the
Grown to make discretionary payments in respect of treasure trove
objects was specifically preserved by cl. 3. This presumably reflects
the view that although a rationalization of the conditions on which
rewards are dispensed has considerable prima facie attraction,
this is outweighed by the lack of flexibility which might accompany
such change. When the circumstances of finds vary from extremes
as great as the chance discovery of a gold bracelet on a beach, to the
premeditated depredation of another's property without his consent
or even knowledge, a high degree of flexibility in the allocation of
rewards might be thought worth retaining.
It would seem unfortunate that so modest and elementary a reform
as the Bill envisaged could not find support on all sides of the House,
especially as the Bill does not seek to abolish the law of treasure
trove. It was noteworthy that there was no suggestion of the more
radical reform of compulsory purchase of items of historical
significance," in the way that can be achieved in the sphere of real
property. If there is justification for the latter, is it so unreasonable
to include the former? This might be thought particularly unexceptionable when items have been recovered from an archaeological
excavation, and which no-one has in any real sense hitherto enjoyed
or had the use of.

The protection of ancient sites
One of the results of a long and continuous history of habitation in a
small country is that there must be few areas of the country which
could not be regarded as of archaeological interest. Nevertheless,
some areas are likely to be richer in finds than others, and it is
natural that protection should be emphasized in those areas. The
general protection from development or destruction of land and
buildings which may be considered as "monuments" has been the
subject of a series of statutes from 1882 to the present time, of which
the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 is of
special importance. The 1979 Act 17 largely supersedes, improves
and extends the protection afforded by the earlier legislation. Its
detailed provisions relating to the planning controls which affect
archaeological sites which are scheduled as ancient monuments have
What follows conbeen considered in some detail elsewhere.'
centrates on those provisions of the Act which are of novel interest,
having no precedent in special planning controls but which have an
impact on the protection of portable antiquities.
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The new protective legislation

Part II of the Act
There was provision under s. 7 Ancient Monuments Act 1931 for an
offence of damaging a scheduled monument, the maximum fine
being £20 and/or one month's imprisonment. Convictions under
this legislation appear to have been very uncommon, and one may
wonder how efficacious it ever was. The restricted scope of its
provisions, being limited to monuments, should be compared to the
provisions of Part II of the 1979 Act, potentially the most farreaching part of the legislation, which envisages a scheme for the
protection of entire archaeological areas. Section 33 of the 1979
Act allows the Secretary of State for the Environment or a local
authority to designate an area as one of "archaeological importance"
by means of a "designation order." Once such a designation order
is in force, a complex protective machinery is invoked. Any developer
of the land must thereafter serve on the district council an "operations
notice" at least six weeks before undertaking any operations which
will disturb the ground, or flood or involve tipping on it. Failure to
do so is an offence under s. 35(1). Once such notice has been received,
the "investigating authority," ie, the person designated by the
Secretary of State under s.34 as being competent to undertake
archaeological excavations, will be informed by the district council
and can consider appropriate action. A number of options are then
available which are relevant to the protection of portable antiquities.
The archaeologists may of course be able to negotiate a voluntary
agreement with the developer which will enable them to carry out an
excavation. Failing this, s.38(1) provides for a right of entry to
inspect the site and determine whethe'r it would be desirable to carry
out excavations. Even more importantly, the investigating authority
after giving due notice has a right under s. 38(2) to excavate the site.
The period allowed under s. 39(4) is four months and two weeks.
Allowing for service of the requisite notices, a developer could be
put to a maximum statutory delay of six months, without
compensation. The protection given to portable antiquities by Part II
of the Act is characteristically somewhat oblique and in particular it
may be noted that there is no provision for compulsory purchase of
any especially valuable items which might be recovered. Subject to
the law of treasure trove and any contractual provision to the
contrary, any articles recovered will generally belong to the landowner, although by s. 54 there is a power to remove an article
temporarily for the purposes of examining, testing, treating or
recording it, but the owner's consent is required to retain the article
beyond such period "as may reasonably be required" to carry out
these exercises. Nevertheless this part of the Act ensures that
antiquities in a designated area cannot be readily destroyed before
their presence has even been detected. As such, the Act is designed
to make provision for recording but is not to be considered a
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conservation measure per se. Once they have been located and
recovered, public interest or pressure can then have some effect on
their ultimate destination.
PartsI and III of the Act
Section 28 increases the penalties that existed under the 1931 Act for
the offence of damaging an ancient monument which under the
1979 Act includes a specific site of archaeological interest, as distinct
from any land comprised in a designation order made under
Part II. The person charged must know the monument was scheduled,
or owned or subject to guardianship by the Secretaryof State or a
local authority, and he must intend to destroy or damage the
monument or be reckless as to the same. The offence is triable
summarily or on indictment. In the former case it is punishable by a
fine not exceeding the "statutory maximum" 19 and/or six months
imprisonment, while in the latter case is punishable by a fine and/or
up to two years' imprisonment. Whilst this offence is clearly
appropriate to cover damage to the fabric of an ancient monument,
it could cover damage incidental to some other activity, for example
theft or attempted theft of some portable antiquity, thereby providing additional means of protection.
Although this provision may occasionally be applicable, of more
direct relevance to the protection of portable antiquities is the
completely new offence created to restrict the use of metal detectors.
Section 42(1) makes it an offence to use a metal' detector in a
protected place without the consent of the Secretary of State.
"Metal detector" signifies any device designed or adapted for
detecting or locating any metal or mineral in the ground. The term
"protected place" covers not only a scheduled monument or one
under guardianship, but also an area designated as of archaeological
importance and therefore is of relevance to Parts I, II and III of the
'Act.' The offence is punishable summarily by a fine of up to £200.
Section 42 (3) creates an aggravated form of the offence, that of
removing an object of historical or archaeological interest discovered
by a metal detector in a protected place. The punishment in this
case on summary conviction is a fine, not exceeding the statutory
maximum, or on indictment to a fine without limit.
The origins of this new offence lie in the need to control the
growing popularity of "treasure hunting" as a pastime. The
'requirement under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 for a Pipefinder Metal Detector Licence was an ineffective means of control,
and has now been abandoned: see Hansard, vol. 988, col. 357. The,
former requirement for a licence did at least give a minimum figure
for the number of detectors in operation, and even these figures
show a staggering increase. In 1961, 400 licences were issued, but
-by 1979 the total figure exceeded 130,000. The result of this increased
activity has been the formation of two rival campaigns: STOP
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("Stop Taking Our Past") an umbrella organization designed to
represent various archaeological interests, including the Council for
British Archaeology, and DIG ("Detector Information Group")
formed to put forward the case of users and manufacturers of metal
detectors. Space does not permit a detailed assessment of the
conflicting views put forward, and doubtless there are many detector
users who behave in a responsible and even public spirited way.
Nevertheless, the claims by detector users that minimal damage is
.caused by a tiny percentage of irresponsible users is a sweeping
assertion of dubious optimism. There is considerable evidence that a
large number of sites have been damaged by use of metal detectors,
both "virgin" sites and even areas in the course of excavation. 21
The uncontrolled removal of metal objects from their archaeological
context means they are robbed of their scientific value in addition to
the damage done to adjacent objects or the stratigraphy of the site.
A Roman coin for example, which can itself be readily dated, can be
used in turn to date the site or the stratum in which it is found. If it
is removed, the archaeologist is deprived not only of an interesting
artefact, but also the chance to date other material found in the
same context. The damage once done will usually be irreparable.
There is also evidence that there is growing up a substantial commercial market in portable antiquities, the provenance of which is
sometimes uncertain.
The introduction of such an offence is a welcome addition that
will do something to curb a growing menace to portable antiquities.
It is noteworthy that under s.42(1) the mere use of a metal detector
constitutes an offence and no ulterior intent, for example to damage
or steal, needs to be proved. Rather curiously, s. 42 ( 6 ) introduces a
defence that the accused was using the metal detector for a purpose
other than detecting or locating objects of archaeological or historical
interest. Is this not a somewhat generous defence to an accused?
The mischief aimed at is surely the disturbance of the site often
consequent upon use of a metal detector, so why should it make a
difference that the user is interfering with the archaeological remains
because he is looking for something other than historical artefacts?
If he has a legitimate reason for using a detector, there is provision
for its use with the consent- of the Secretary of State under s. 42(4).
Section 42(7) introduces a rather more problematic defence, that
the accused had taken "all reasonable precautions" to find out if the
area in which he was operating was a protected place, and that he
did not believe that it was. What will amount to "all reasonable
precautions"? The Act offers no guidance and it may well be that
this subsection will prove to be of considerable importance. Anyone
who makes a reasonable assessment based on a consultation of the
records held by the Department of the Environment or by the
appropriate local authority has clearly done enough. What if the
detector user has simply asked the local farmer or landowner? Is he
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still obliged to check the official records and even for example,
search in the local Land Charges Register? The uncertainty in the
application of the defence resides perhaps in whether a court chose to
emphasize the "all" or the "reasonable" element in "all reasonable
precautions." Had the statute used the phrase "all practicable
precautions" then it might be easier to argue for a strict and narrow
application of the defence. As it is, the wording of the subsection
suggests that the matter must be decided as a question of fact in the
light of all the circumstances. Presumably, therefore, a very youthful
or inexperienced detector user might be excused for relying on a
farmer's reply whereas an older and more experienced user might
reasonably be expected to know that land owners are not always
completely conversant with restrictions affecting their land and that
official records can easily be checked. Accordingly, he should not be
able to avail himself of the defence. Having regard to the fact that
checking documents is likely to be a relatively simple, even if timeconsuming affair, there would seem much to be said for favouring a
restrictive view of the availability of the defence.
Both subsections make clear that once the prosecution have
established their case beyond reasonable doubt, the onus is on the
defendant to establish on a balance of probabilities that he can bring
himself within one of the defences. It is necessary to do more than
merely raise a reasonable doubt. Rather surprisingly, however, the
Act does not provide the court with any power to order the forfeiture
of a metal detector, or any artefact found, if the accused is convicted
of an offence under s. 42. This omission could be partly circumvented
in an appropriate case by a charge of theft and the invocation of the
restitution provisions in s. 28 of the Theft Act 1968. Nevertheless,
the addition of a forfeiture power to the 1979 Act would seem a
simple and obvious improvement.
Scope of "designated areas"
The effectiveness of the protection offered by the new Act will to a
considerable extent depend upon the willingness with which local
authorities or the Secretary of State are prepared to make designations of areas of archaeological importance. The omens are not
favourable for a generous interpretation of the power. In a written
answer on April 14, 1980, see Hansard, vol.982 col. 496, Hector
Munro, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, made clear that
"designation under Part II of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 will be limited to a few areas of the highest
archaeological importance, where it appears unlikely that co-operation from developers to enable archaeological access or excavation
would otherwise be forthcoming..." More recently in the Department of the Environment Consultative Document circulated in
January 1981,22 the view is expressed that having regard to the
slower rate of urban development in the 1980s compared with the
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197 0s and earlier, and improved co-operation between archaeologists
and developers, "designation should be reserved for those areas
where its reserve powers are demonstrably necessary." A factor
which, although not often expressed, may be a further deterrent to
designation is the fear that such orders will frighten off developers
and lead to reduced job opportunities. Some such fear seems tc lie
behind the refusal of Gloucester and Lincoln to participate in an
experimental scheme of voluntary designation: The Guardian,
August 8, 1981. Accordingly, the impressive array of protection
under the Act could be subtly subverted to a large extent by an overcautious policy in the making of designation orders. Since the
provisions of the Act need not detract from arrangements of voluntary
co-operation, and need be invoked only when such desirable goodwill
has failed, it is difficult to justify such conservatism.
Section 53 enables the protection of the 1979 Act to be extended
to monuments in or under the sea bed within territorial waters.
A moot point is whether the law of treasure trove has application to
goods concealed under coastal waters. Professor Palmer sees no
reason in theory why treasure trove should be confined to terrestrial
hoards although there appears to be no reported case on the matter.
In the case of native offerings of gold and silver cast into the sea.
it would seem that such goods could not be regarded as treasure
trove, as there would seem to be no animus revertendi. Such seems to
be the view of Chitty.2 3
Other Criminal Sanctions
The 1979 Act does not affect an owner's rights in respect of the
property in or on his land nor the law of treasure trove. Accordingly,
since the demise of the common-law offence of concealment of
treasure trove, 24 there is the possibility of a prosecution for theft
under the Theft Act 1968 against a finder who conceals his discovery.
The crucial stumbling block to any prosecution for theft under s. 1
of the Theft Act 1968 is likely to be the problem of "dishonesty."
All the authoritative cases are agreed that "dishonesty" is essentially a
question of fact for the jury or bench of magistrates the answer to
which will depend on all the circumstances of the case. The Court of
Appeal in R. v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689, has now laid down a
twofold test which does much to clarify the previous conflicting case
law. The tribunal of fact must first ask itself, according to the ordinary
standards of reasonable and honest people, was the act dishonest?
Only if the answer to this is "yes" is it necessary to ask the final
question, did the defendant realize that what he was doing was
dishonest by those standards. The test therefore contains both
"objective" and "subjective" elements, and clearly includes as
dishonest anyone who entertains even a genuine belief that he was
morally justified in acting as he did if he knew that such conduct was
proscribed by law or that ordinary people would consider it to be
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dishonest. Robin Hood could now be convicted of theft with little
difficulty! Whilst every case must be judged on its own peculiar facts
(including for example the mode and time of entry on to property),
it may well be that the defence of lack of dishonesty under the Theft
Act 1968 may become more precarious as public awareness of the
problems and dangers posed by treasure hunting increases.
No farmer or landowner would be likely to encourage metaldetector users to make damaging holes in his land. It is also increasingly
well known that the market and interest in portable antiquities
makes the removal of even Victorian bottles a loss of a valuable
commodity, quite apart from obviously valuable coins and metal
work. As Charles Sparrow QC has succinctly put it, "the so-called
'treasure-hunter' has no claim under the Theft Act to be treated as a
special case": The Magistrate (1978) 34, 20. There is no difficulty
over the "property" ingredient of the offence, since quite clearly
s.4(2)(b) Theft Act 1968 provides that appropriation by a person
not in possession of the land by severing a part of the land or causing
it to be severed, is theft.
In a case where, for example, it could be established that a metaldetector user was on his way to a site where such use was known to
be prohibited, there is the possibility of a prosecution under s. 25
Theft Act 1968. This makes it an offence for a person "when not at
his place of abode" to have with him, "any article for use in the
course of or-in connection with any burglary, theft or cheat." In
those cases where holes have been dug on a site to recover artefacts,
a charge could be brought under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
Whilst it is more generally applied to other situations, s. 10 brings
the definition of property broadly in line with the Theft Acts, and so
includes real property" in which the user hopes artefacts are
contained.
It may also be open to local authorities to make bye-laws under a
range of statutory powers including the "good rule and government"
provision of s.235 of the Local Government Act 1972, which
confers a general power to legislate where there are no other
provisions available. This would seem to be appropriate in the
context of protection of any area of archaeological interest which
would otherwise attract the attention of metal-detector users,
especially in view of the announced reluctance to make designation
orders. It seems therefore that as the 1979 Act is silent on the matter
of bye-laws, the use of the s. 235 power may be the only effective
protection for extensive areas of the country where buried portable
26
antiquities are at risk.
From protection to conservation
So far discussion has been limited to the discovery and protection of
portable antiquities. A completely different but equally important
set of problems is raised after the identification and recovery of an
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artefact, problems which are shared equally by artefacts such as
paintings and sculptures which have been carefully preserved since
their first creation. The law is required to cope with the often
conflicting claims of political and cultural interests transcending;
national borders; adequate funding of public institutions to enable
them to exercise their function of conservation of items representing
the national heritage; and the problems of export control in a growing commercial market. In relation to the last two matters, revenue
considerations may hold an important and under-utilized key to the
solution of the problem of inadequate conservation arrangements.
In the international context, a growing claim which must be taken
into consideration comes from the increased sense of national
identity of former colonies, and their recognition that items which
may properly be regarded as belonging to their cultural heritage
should be returned to them: see "The Empire Strikes Back"; The
Guardian, June 3, 1981. The processes of acquisition in the colonial
past led to the transference of portable antiquities on a large scale
from areas as far apart as Africa and Polynesia. The attempt to
retrieve such objects as the Benin Bronzes removed by a British
punitive expedition in 1897 has been the background to the formation
of such bodies as the Unesco Intergovernmental Committee for
Promoting the Return of Cultural Property or its Restitution in
Case of Illicit Appropriation. Of course it may never be desirable to
return all such artefacts, but the need to face up to such problems is
hardly likely to diminish, and will almost certainly become more
acute.
A particular problem in this area is posed by the restrictive
wording of s. 3(4) of the British Museum Act 1963, which provides
that objects shall not be disposed of by the Trustees otherwise than
in accordance with certain strict conditions."7 'These are largely set
out in s. 5, which provides a number of exceptions. These include
the duplication of an article, and provided it does not violate the
terms of a gift or bequest, the disposal of an object which is "unfit to
be retained" and can be disposed of "without detriment to the
interests of students." Thus even if for political or diplomatic reasons
an object could be regarded as "unfit to be retained," it could hardly
be said that objects such as the Benin Bronzes could be retained
without violating the latter condition. To some extent the difficulty
can be circumvented by a generous interpretation of the lending
provisions in s. 4, but this does not seem to be a satisfactory solution.
The answer, it is submitted, is in response to the growing interest in
all nations in cultural heritage to widen the Trustees powers under
the 1963 Act.

Public institutions and the National Heritage Act
Although a critical survey of the English Law o'n the topic of
portable antiquities shows clear evidence' of inadequacy, an important

ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW RE VIEW
remedial step has been taken by the terms of a new statute, the
National Heritage Act 1980, and by an associated provision contained
in the Finance Act 1980, s. 118, which came into force on March 31,
1980 and April 1, 1980 respectively.
The National Heritage Act 1980
The object of the National Heritage Act 1980 was to implement the
proposals of the White Paper "A National Heritage Fund" by
establishing a trust fund (The National Heritage Memorial Fund)
from which the trustees may make grants and loans for the acquisition,
maintenance and preservation of real or personal property which is
"of importance to the national heritage," (s. 3(2)). While the 1980;
Act confers powers to enable the trustees to finance purchases of
land, 28 the discussion of the Act which follows is limited to the
acquisition of personal property in order to remain within the ambit
of this article.
It is, hopefully, well known that there are many funds which exist
in non-statutory forms which are available to our national museums,
galleries and libraries to assist them in the purchase of portable
antiquities, and also that central government makes purchase grants
available to such institutions via the administrative organs of the
Victoria and Albert Museum and the Science Museum. In addition
to these resources there is also a statutory precedent for the National
Heritage Memorial Fund in that a National Land Fund was
established in 1946 (Finance Act 1946, s. 48) with the intention of
providing a permanent memorial to those British service-men who
lost their lives in the two World Wars by the acquisition of real
property forming part of the national heritage. This fund could be
used (inter alia) to finance acquisitions by the Secretary of State of
buildings which appeared to him to be of outstanding historic or
architectural interest, toether with their contents: Historic Buildings
and Ancient Monuments Act 1953, ss5 and 7. The fund was relieved
of most of its assets (initially £50 million) in 1957 by s. 41 of the
Finance Act of that year, and became less effective than many
observers would consider desirable, bearing in mind the spirit in
which the Fund was created, with the result that the lack of revenue
vested in the Fund and the unco-ordinated nature of the resources of
the British cultural institutions could not prevent the controversial
sale of the Mentmore estate and contents in 197729 an event which
the National Land Fund was not even called upon to attempt to
prevent. That regrettable occurrence emphasized the need for a
properly administered -institution, with suitable statutory powers
and with independence from central government control, and the
necessary resources to prevent further losses of items which contribute to our heritage.
The National Heritage Memorial Fund was established by the
1980 Act to try to fill, at least to some extent, the gap exposed by the
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Mentmore affair and to make changes in the administration of the
scheme for acceptance of property in lieu of capital transfer tax.
Thus s. 1 of the Act created a body corporate known as the Trustees
of the National Heritage Memorial Fund to whom have been
transferred the remaining assets of the National Land Fund," and
which is to receive an annual grant payable under s. 2 of the Act.
At the outset the Fund had total assets of £12.4 million, including
the first annual grant of £5.5 million (the second annual grant was
£3.0 million), the latter sum having been determined by the Secretary
of State for the Environment and the Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster who jointly exercised the ministerial powers conferred by
the Act. 31 The Trustees of the Fund are appointed by the Prime
Minister and comprise a chairman and up to 10 other members. All
the appointments have been made, the chairman being Lord
32
Charteris of Amisfield.
While the Act provides the statutory framework within which the
Trustees have to carry on their task of evaluating applications for
assistance, there is very little detail contained in the Act beyond
describing the type of property which may be the subject of a grant
or loan and the eligible recipients of such assistance. To supplement
the Act the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster jointly issued "Guidelines for the Trustees," dated
August 11, 1980, but which were not formally announced untii
October 28, 1980.
Application of the assets of the National Heritage Memorial Fund
The Trustees of the fund are empowered by s. 3 to advance money
by way of grant or loan to "eligible recipients" for the purpose of
assisting them to "acquire, maintain or preserve" the following
items of personal property:
(a) any object which in their opinion is of outstanding historic, artistic or
scientific interest;
(b) any collection or group of objects, being a collection or group which taken
as a whole is in their opinion of outstanding historic, artistic or scientific
interest.

The "eligible recipients" of grants or loans for the purpose of
enabling them to acquire, maintain or preserve the property of this
description are listed in s. 3(6). These are:
(a) any museum, art gallery, library or other similar institution having as its
purpose or one of its purposes the preservation for the public benefit of a
collection of historic, artistic or scientific interest;
(b) the Secretary of State acting in exercise of his functions under s. 5 of the
Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953 (acquisition of
buildings of special architectural or historic interest together with their
contents).
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Before giving any assistance under the Act the Trustees must be
satisfied, after obtaining such expert advice as appears to them to be
appropriate, that the object in question is "of importance to the
national heritage": s. 3(2). This is not an expression defined by the
Act but the Guidelines show that this was a deliberate omission and
that the Trustees should proceed to draw up their own "working
definition," possibly but not necessarily with a view to publication 3
Early in their existence the Trustees considered publishing their
definition of "national heritage" but decided that the concept is
both too abstract and too broad. After one year of exercising their
functions under the Act the Trustees stated in their Annual Report
that they could no more define the national heritage than they could
define "beauty" or "art." Instead, they preferred to let the national
heritage virtually define itself by responding to requests for aid from
eligible recipients who considered that they were dealing with parts
of the national heritage which warranted assistance. It is clear from
examination of the details of items which have been the subject of
grant or loan that the concept is exceptionally broad. This openminded approach is supported by the absence of any policy restricting the categories of items which should be the subject of assistance
or of any fettering of discretion by identification of priorities.
To illustrate the wide-ranging and flexible nature of the powers
available to the Trustees it may be noted that the Guidelines also
make it clear that the Trustees may use the Fund to give eligible
recipients assistance for the purpose of bringing back from abroad
objects with a clear British connection.' Similarly, there is no limit
on the amount of any single grant or loan, given only that the Fund
has the necessary reserves. Thus money may in theory be advanced
for large numbers of comparatively humble acquisitions, and for
more ambitious purchases, as is illustrated by the Trustees advance
of £500,000 to the Victoria and Albert Museum to purchase a
unique medieval English enamelled ciborium (circa 1180) from
Lord Balfour of Burleigh, believed to be valued at Im. In the first
full year of the use of the Fund 22 allocations were made, mostly by
way of grant, 10 of which were for the acquisition of individual
paintings or collections ranging from a grant of £825,000 to the
National Gallery towards the purchase from the Luton Hoo
collection of A. Altdorfer's "Christ Taking Leave of His Mother,"
to a grant of £1,150 to the Ashmolean Museum towards .the purchase
of Paolo de Matteis' "The Choice of Hercules." The range of the
balance of allocations is illustrated by the grant of £50,769 to
Lincolnshire County Library towards the purchase of some Tennyson
manuscripts, including a manuscript of "In Memoriam," and a
grant of £14,375 to the Fitzwilliam Museum, Camlridge, towards
the purchase of a 9th/10th Century illustrated Latin manuscript of
the Gospels, known to have been in Britain since at least 1000 AD,
which was being sold by private owners.
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While it would be interesting to discuss the features of each
individual use of the Fund, the authors' present purpose is to point
out that this Act is no panacea, for it is apparent that the Government
expects the Fund to be regarded as something of a last resort for
assistance, a role which the Trustees readily accept by describing
their function in the first Annual Report as a "voyage of mercy
with many ports of call." The Trustees are thus an ultimate safety
net and the Guidelines make it clear that private sources of finance
should have been explored before application to the Trustees is
made. This may, for instance, involve application to the National
Art Galleries Fund, the Pilgrim Trust, or the National Art Collections
Fund, while the private trust funds of any given eligible recipient
should also be considered first. Public appeals are also.not to be
ruled out. It is the intention of the Trustees that applicants for
assistance must not only make efforts of their own to raise money
but also must demonstrate local support for saving an item. But is
not the need for such a fund at its greatest when public awareness of
an object's worth is at its least? It is more difficult to raise funds for
saving family archives than to save a painting and therefore such
projects are inevitably less attractive to the Trustees, but despite
these unofficial limitations there is no evidence to suggest they deter
potential applicants.
To be an eligible recipient it is not essential that a museum,
gallery, or library should be publicly owned. Private institutions are
eligible recipients within s. 3(6) if their intention is preservation of
some part of the national heritage, but it is a condition that public
access to the relevant object is granted at reasonable times."5 The
Trustees are not mere financiers, even for the public institutions, as
the Trustees themselves are empowered to acquire, maintain or
preserve property falling within s. 3(1). But this is a limited power,
as s. 4(3) provides that any property should not be retained by the
Trustees except in such cases and for such periods as the Secretary
of State may allow. The obiect is clearly that the Trustees shruld
transfer their acquisitions to eligible recipients at a future stage but
should not be hampered by the lack of immediate proximity of an
eligible recipient when it is clear that urgent action is needed to
purchase personalty of importance to the national heritage which
might otherwise be lost to the nation by suppression or export.
A good example of the use of this power is provided by the Trustees'
purchases of five pieces of Indian ivory furniture and a silver
centrepiece previously belonging to Lord Curzon which were sold
from Kedleston Hall. Pending the anticipated settlement of the
future of the Hall the pieces are deposited in the Victoria and
Albert Museum and the British Museum with the intention of
returning the pieces to the house, which it is anticipated will pass
into public ownership. The Trustees are similarly empowered by
s. 5 to accept gifts of property but these should also be transferred to
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eligible recipients in due course. Following the enactment of s. 118
of the Finance Act 1980 the Trustees are accorded charitable status
for the purpose of s. 360 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act
1970 which provides for numerous special exemptions from fiscal
measures applicable to income. They are also exempt from capital
gains tax.
Capital transfer tax and acceptance in lieu
The Act makes no changes to the liability to capital transfer tax but
s. 8 provides for the transfer of the responsibility of the Treasury for.
acceptance of property in lieu of the tax to the Secretary of State. It
is now in the discretion of the Secretary of State whether to reimburse the Commissioners of Inland Revenue the net cost of any
property accepted in lieu of tax out of their Votes although in
practice this is always done. In due course this function may in turn
be transferred to the Trustees by the making of an Order in Council
under s. 14 of the 1980 Act, but the White Paper recommending the
establishment of the National Heritage Memorial Fund also
recommended abolition of the acceptance-in-lieu procedure and
replacement by a system of sales by private treaty operated through
the Fund. This proposal may overtake any possible exercise of the
power under s. 14 although the Trustees have not entered into
discussions with the Government regarding either matter. A further
is called
possible improvement to the acceptance-in-lieu procedure
Memorial Fund. They
for by the Trustees of the National Heritage
point out that "[tihe present refusal to give either 'change' or tax
credit when items of value greater than the tax debt are offered has
meant the loss of significant items": First Annual Report of the
Trustees of the National Heritage Memorial Fund (1981) HMSO.
Export control
While the Acts of 1979 and 1980 are presently having only a
limited effect in redressing the balance in favour of conservation of
portable antiquities, emphasis must be placed upon a further matter
of fundamental importance, namely the law and practice of export
licensing. At first glance one might expect that, in noting the
existence of a system of export licensing, one might further expect
that control of exportation might act as a final legal safeguard, or
"longstop" device, to preserve the national heritage when antiquities
do not pass into public ownership, or the Trustees of the National
Heritage Memorial Fund are unable to assist eligible recipients,
whether public or private. By the operation of export control it
may at least be hoped that antiquities would remain in the United
Kingdom. On examination, however, the system of export licensing
is lamentably inadequate to prevent loss of antiquities because only
a small proportion of items destined for export are subject to,
control and the control system itself is of only limited efficacy in
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ensuring retention in this country.
The current system of export control is founded upon the Import,
Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, s. 1 of which
permits the making of export control orders by the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry 6 breach of which may, according to
circumstances, involve a number of possible criminal offences which
are discussed below. Goods which are subject to export control are
listed in sch. 1 of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1978 (as
amended).3 7 Examination of the Order shows that it is principally
concerned with aircraft, military equipment, materials relevant to
atomic energy and strategic goods - which reflects the nature of the
enabling Act - however Group B ofsch. 1 Part I of the Order, which
deals with miscellaneous items, is headed "Photographic material,
antiques, collectors' items etc." The effect of the Order is to place a
general prohibition on the export of all goods "manufactured or
produced" more than 50 yearss8 before the date of export, except in
the case of photographic positives and negatives, postage stamps
and other articles of philatelic interest, documents concerning the
personal affairs of the exporter or spouse, any goods exported by
and being the personal property of the manufacturer or producer or
the spouse. widow or widower of that person. Where these exceptions
apply export control is relaxed, except that relating to photographic
materials. In this instance, export of materials produced more than
60 years before the date of export, having a value of£200 or more in
respect of' any individual item, is subject to export control except
when the materials are the personal property of the manufacturer or
producer or the spouse, widow or widower of that person.
This general prohibition on export is qualified by Article 3(a)
of the 1981 Order which permits the export of goods under the
authority of a licence granted for the purpose by the Secretary of
State. Specific application for an export licence is, in most cases,
unnecessary as the Secretary of State periodically issues instruments
known as "Open General Export Licences" which serve to grant
permission for export of items falling within the scope of such
licences. The current Open General Export Licence 9 was issued on
March 5, 1980 and permits the export of antiquities valued at less
than £8,000, or matching sets of articles collectively valued at less
than £8,0O0.' For the purposes of this licence an "antique" means
any article "manufactured or produced" more than 50 years before
the date of export, but the licence does not include documents,
manuscripts and archives, other than printed books, printed
pamphlets or similar printed matter, nor newspapers, periodicals or
magazines, or papers relating to the personal affairs of the exporter
or spouse of the exporter. Also excluded are articles recovered from
the soil or from the bed of any inland water or the territorial limits
of the sea bed, unless such items are coins or have been buried or
concealed within the past 50 years. It will be observed therefore
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that export of archaeological material buried or concealed for over
50 years is not permitted otherwise than by a specific licence.41
Export control is further relaxed by the issue of "bulk licences" to
regular exporters in lieu of individual export licences. A bulk licence
permits the export of documents, manuscripts, archives or a group
of associated such documents which are valued at not more than
£200 per article, or per group of articles, as the case may be.
Specific licences are required in respect of such items valued at more
than £200 and also in respect of three further categories of documents etc: (a) papers and memoranda of those who have held public
office relating to that office; (b) manuscript Books of Hours,
Missals, Psalters, Antiphoners and Graduals, and illuminated or
illustrated manuscripts in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Urdu and other
oriental languages and miniature paintings by Persian, Chinese,
and other eastern artists, whether in, or extracted from, books or
albums which are valued at more than £2,000 each; (c) any item or
group of associated items recognized by the holder of the bulk
licence as being of national importance, irrespective of value. This
last category of exceptions requires the co-operation of regular
exporters in that the onus is placed upon them to act conscientiously.
Thus the holders of bulk licences should take into account the
national or local importance of.any item in deciding whether to
export it under a bulk licence. In 1978-79 and 1979-80 and 1980-81,
the total number of applications for items in this category were 26,
21 and 22 respectively. In evaluating the importance of documents
the exporter must ensure that the archivist's point of view is given
consideration with particular attention given to the consequences of
breaking up a collection by selective export and when it is appropriate;
should apply for a specific licence. When a specific licence is applied
for, the application should state that the documents concerned are
part of a larger archive or collection, although it is not necessary to
deposit copies with the application with the Export Licensing Branch
of the Department of Trade and Industry. The Department of
Trade and Industry may, however, insist on the deposit of a copy of
a document as a condition of export if the item is considered to be of
British historical or literary interest.
The effect of the use of Open General Export Licences and bulk
licences is such that almost all export activity is automatically
licensed. Thus trade returns reveal that in the years 1975-6; 1976-7;
1977-8; 1978-9 and 1979-80 the number of paintings and drawings
exported (including re-exports) totalled 61,723; 60,708; 75,033;
97,024 and 74,550 respectively.4 2 The total value of these and other
items was £177,010,000; £229,835,000; £246,735,000; £310,812,000
and £336,181,000 respectively.4 3 During this period the number of
applications for specific export licences were only 2,559, 3,254,
3,604, 2,838 and 3,639 respectively. Of these the majority were
granted, the number of individual items ultimately exported being
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2,612, 3,682, 3,842, 2,309, and 2,678 respectively. In 1980-81,
4,052 applications were made and the number of items exported
totalled 4,500.
The criteria for determining whether an export licence should be
issued are the considerations recommended as a guide by the Waverley
Committee Report of 1952. These are (a) is the object so closely
connected withour history and national life that its departure
would be a misfortune?, (b) is it of outstanding aesthetic importance?,
(c) is it of outstanding significance to the study of some particular
branch of art, learning or history? These criteria are applied by the
Department of Trade and Industry, after reference to expert
advisers on the question of the national importance of any given
item. When an expert adviser recommends that a licence should be
refused on grounds of national importance the matter is referred to
the Government's Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of
Art which has powers to refuse the grant of a licence after hearing
the applicant, usually through an expert representative, who is
advised of the objection to export and is provided with a copy of the
exDert adviser's written statement of the case against the issue of a
licence. Other than the application of the Waverley criteria the
Reviewing Committee does not give reasons for their decisions
from which there is no appeal. However, no appeal system is
necessary for the effect is that the Reviewing Committee can
recommend only that, where appropriate, an export licence shall
be withheld for a specific period, usually three or six months, during
which an offer to purchase at a valuation recommended by the
Committee may be made. If no offer to purchase is made by one of
the established institutions, including the Trustees of the National
Heritage Memorial Fund, an export licence will be granted, but if
an offer is made and refused no licence will be issued. In practice,
very few applications come before the Reviewing Committee as is
illustrated by the following table:'
Year

1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81

Total
number of
applications

15
11
28
33
16
15

103
Totals
Averages 20.6

Number of
cases where
export
licence was
suspended

Number of Number of Value of
works
works
works
exported
exported
retained

% of cases
where a
licence was
eventually
granted

13
8
20
23
11
12

9
5
12
21
7
8

4
3
8
2
4
4

202,081
299,400
1,008,900
108,900
512,817
5.215.588

30.8
37.5
40.0
8.7
36.4
33.4

74
14.8

53
10.6

21
4.2

7,145,189
1,429,038

31.2
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It can be appreciated from these figures that at the apex of the
export control system, arrangements are satisfactory and that the
finest of items are retained in the United Kingdom. Concern may
however be considered appropriate in the case of items falling within
the scope of the current Open General Export Licence as the freedom
it confers on exporters is based on a financial criterion without
regard to the possible intrinsic value of a given item. No machinery.
exists to draw the attention of experts to items for export although
it must be conceded that export control has been tightened by a new
provision contained in the current Open General Export Licence
relating to British historical personages. Thus a restriction now
applies to items consisting of, or including any representation of, the
likeness (whether two or three dimensions) of any person, except'
photographs and coins, in respect of whom an entry appears in the:
Dictionary of National Biography (or any supplements thereto),
"Who's Who," or "Who Was Who." The restriction prohibits
the export of any such item unless the value is less than £2,000, or if
its value is £2,000 or more, but less than £8,000, and the exporter
produces to the proper officer of Customs and Excise at the place of
export a certificate from either the Director of the National Portrait
Gallery or the Keeper of the Scottish National Portrait Gallery
stating that in his opinion the object concerned is not a work of
national importance.
As demonstrated by the trade returns, export control is effectively
negatived by the issue of the Open General Export Licence and,
where appropriate, bulk licences. The scope for prosecution for
breach of export control is thus not very significant and, more
importantly, there is little hope of recovery of illegally exported
items. Under existing law goods which are exported in contravention
of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1978 are deemed to be
"prohibited goods" for the purposes of s.3(1) of the Import,
Export and Customs Powers Defence Act 1939, with the result that
the goods concerned are forfeited to the Crown, and, in addition,
the exporter or his agent or the shipper of the goods is liable to a
customs penalty of £500." s If an export licence is obtained the
exporter having knowingly or recklessly made a false statement in a
material particular, an offence is committed which is punishable on
summary conviction by a customs' penalty not exceeding £1,000,
but on indictment is punishable by an unlimited fine or up to two
years imprisonment, or both, and the licence is invalid ab initio:
Export of Goods (Control) Order 1978 art. 5. A further control
arises from the need to deliver in the case of all exports an "entry
outwards" to the Commissioners for Customs and Excise for
revenue purposes: failure to do so renders the goods liable to
forfeiture and, if done with fraudulent intent, any person concerned
with knowledge of that intent is liable to a penalty of three times the
value of the goods or £100, whichever is the greater, or imprison-
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ment for up to two years, or both: Customs and Excise Act 1952,
s. 47 (1)(3).
While these provisions for criminal penalties may act as some
deterrent to illegal export, in those cases where export control has
been successfully evaded there are no complimentary provisions to
facilitate retrieval of the objects involved. This is due to the absence
of any multi-national treaty which could be called in aid for the
purpose. Even if such arrangements did exist there would be
difficulties in attempting retrieval of objects which have been sold in
the importing country to a bona fide purchaser. The reviewing
Committee has considered this matter and concluded that if a
system of retrieval could be established it would need to be limited
to objects which are still in the control of the illegal exporter: Cmnd
8050, para. 12.
The impact of international treaties upon this area of law is small
but, so far as the EEC is concerned, serves to support our export
control system. This can be demonstrated by the attitude of the
Reviewing Committee in one celebrated recent example, concerning
the Committee's consideration of a silver plaque by Paul van
Vianen which had been purchased by the Rijksmuseum in
Amsterdam. The Reviewing Committee declined an export licence
on application of the second and third of the Waverley criteria and
it was suggested these criteria might be inconsistent with European
Community Law.
This argument was based on arts 30-36 of the EEC Treaty. More
specifically art. 34 prohibits the application to intra-Community
trade of quantitative restrictions on exports, or measures having an
equivalent 'effect. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are
both, of course, member states of the European Communities.
The apparently strict provisions of art. 34 are modified to a certain
extent by the application of what is known as a rule of reason (as
expounded by the Court of.Justice in, inter alia case 8/74 Procureur
du Roi v B. & G. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837) and also by the
provisions of art. 36 of the Treaty. This article is, though, designed
to protect certain deserving interests, not to act as a thoroughfare
for member states and others to drive a coach and horses through
the basic principles of the Treaty. One of these interests deemed
worthy of protection is "the 29 [1974] ECR 837; protection of
national treasures possessing artistic, historic and archaeological
value." It is now clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that
such measures do, prima facie, fall within the scope of arts 30-34
and that the exceptions of art. 36 are permitted only to the extent
that they can be justified on the grounds mentioned.46 So far there
has been no case directly on the exception in respect of national
treasures. However, the Reviewing Committee did think, in respect
of the Paul van Vianen plaque, that the Waverley criteria formed an
acceptable basis for refusing an export licence without losing the
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protection of the first sentence of art. 36. It is submitted that, on the
facts, this view is indeed correct. If, however, it could have been
shewn that the decision to refuse an export licence constituted a
means of arbitrary discrimination, or a disguised restriction on
trade between member states then the decision would - no matter
how supportable for the protection of national treasures - have been
in breach of Community Law. This is the effect of the second
sentence of art. 36.
Although there has been no direct decision on national treasures
and arts 30-36 of the EEC Treaty, certain relevant points arose in
the first Art Treasures case, case 7/68 Commission v Italian Republic
[1968] ECR 423; [1969] CMLR I. In this case the Commission
attacked a progressive tax on the export of art treasures from Italy..
This tax was just one of the several options open to the Italian
Government to enable it to limit the export of Italian antiquities.
It was argued on the government's behalf that the tax fell within the
protection afforded by art. 36. The Court of Justice held that this
was not the case and that consequently the tax was in breach of
Community Law in that it was incompatible with the prohibition of
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect between
Member States contained in art. 9 of the Treaty.
Thus it can be asserted most firmly that any proposal to impose
a tax or duty on the export of national treasures would, insofar as it
purported to affect exports to other member states of the Community,
be illegal.
As has previously been inferred, it is submitted that the decision
of the Reviewing Committee on the van Vianen plaque was correct.
It would seem that in this case (rightly) no argument was advanced
as to the applicability of the second sentence of art. 36.'.
One of the weaknesses of the export control system is that it is
capable of being undermined by the simple method of applying for a
temporary export licence, ostensibly for the purpose of exhibition
abroad. Because the application is not for a permanent export
licence there are no arrangements for suspension of the grant of a'
licence pending an offer to purchase by a British institution. There
is clear potential for abuse here as the exporter may achieve his
object of securing that the item is legally exported and under existing law will not be subject to any penalty if the item should later be
sold. At present such licences are granted in return for an undertaking from the exporter that he will not sell or otherwise dispose of
his property before its return to the United Kingdom at the end of
the period during which its absence was authorized. If the exporter
disposes of the item in breach of his undertaking his conduct may be
considered dishonourable but it is not illegal. The Reviewing
Committee has expressed the view that it is desirable that objects of
national importance should be allowed to leave this country temporarily for purposes such as exhibition or restoration when there is
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no intention of a sale, and it is presently studying the problem of
imposition of sanctions against those who fail to reimport within the
stipulated period. In researching this problem the Committee
investigated 18 cases in which the items had not been returned and
devoted considerable effort to reminding the owners of their
obligations. In all but one case the items were eventually reimported,
but in the one outstanding case concerning a painting of George
Washington by Gilbert Stuart, owned by Lord Rosebery, the
painting was not reimported. It had originally been exported in
August 1968 for exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution in
Washington, the application for the export licence having stated
that the approximate date of its return was January 1969. An
extension of nine months was granted and the Export Licensing
Branch of the Department of Trade and Industry (at that time the
Board of Trade) was advised by Lord Rosebery that the painting
had been requested by the Institution for permanent loan. The
Department agreed to this but wanted Lord Rosebery to give an
undertaking that it would not be sold or disposed of before its return
to the United Kingdom. This suggestion was declined by Lord
Rosebery who stated his intention not to sell, but wished to reserve
the right to change his mind. It would appear that, in contrast to
present practice, no undertaking had been sought at the time of the
export and therefore little pressure could be brought to bear on
lmwd I(.,seberv siue he was not in breach ,1
1';
u1V
(ertaking but
had acted contrary to the terms of the temporary export licence.
This glaring defect in the system might be overcome by the device of
placing the object to be exported in the custody of a British institution
such as the Victoria and Albert Museum, the British Museum or
the National Gallery, and the potential of such arrangements is now
being studied by the Reviewing Committee: The Guardian, June 19.
1981. If a system based on this idea were to be established there
would be no need for temporary export licences as these institutions,
being Crown bodies, are not bound by export control regulations.
Conclusions
While the creation of the National Heritage Memorial Fund is to be
thoroughly applauded it would be wrong to conclude that the law
relating to the preservation*and conservation of artefacts and works
of art is now in an orderly state. A simple comparison with the law
applicable to buildings of special architectural or historic interest,
and ancient monuments of national importance, will make this
conclusion clear. Such buildings and monuments are now subject to
comprehensive, albeit not entirely fool-proof, statutory codes which
confer powers of compulsory purchase 48 on the Secretary of State
and local authorities and establish special planning controls to
prevent their unauthorized alteration or destruction. 4 9 It is however
a commonly heard complaint that the scheme is not as successful in
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the case of listed buildings as may be desirable, for reasons which
are ultimately financial, in that the exercise of default powers
involves significant expense."0 If it is accepted that artefacts and
works of art are just as much a part of the national heritage, the
extent of legal provision for the preservation of them is, in contrast,
very much weaker, fundamentally because there is no comprehensive scheme to ensure conservation.
The reflection that the first Annual Report of the Trustees of the
National Heritage Memorial Fund contains only a very small
glimpse ofthe richness, scope and variety of our national heritage is
a frightening reminder of what we have to lose and have already
lost. The precarious protection offered by the law of treasure trove
and the advent of the readily obtainable metal detector provide
means for the accelerated erosion of our past. A well co-ordinated,
cleariy thought out, legal framework for the protection of our
portable antiquities is essential. It would be unfortunate if this were
realized too late.
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treasure-trove finds in this country. The total value was assessed at £261,540, of which
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21.

We are greatly indebted to Richard Morris, Research Officer of the Council for
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22. See also Scottish Development Department (Ancient Monuments), Consultative
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challenge on the grounds of ultra vires, with particular reference to the application of
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at p. 100. Possible enabling legislation also includes the Open Spaces Act 1906 s. 15;
Commons Act 1899, ss l and 10.
27. A further reason for the modification of this section is provided by the course of the
litigation in Attorney General v The Trustees of the British Museum [19031 2 Ch. 598 the
expense of which seems to have been caused by the forerunner of s.3(4), which was
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33. "Guidelines for the Trustees of the National Heritage Memorial Fund" para. 2. The
Guidelines had not been published at the date of completion of this article.
34. Ibid. para. 3. It is perhaps appropriate to note that the first grant made by the Trustees
was to the Gilbert White museum in Selbourne to purchase the final draft manuscript of
The Natural History of Selbourne which had been brought from the USA for sale.in this
country cf export control discussed below.
35.
36.

Ibid. para. 11
The power to make such orders was originally conferred on the Board of Trade, the
function having been transferred to the Secretary of State for Trade and- Industry by
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Order 1970 SI. 1970. No. 1537.
37. SI. 1981 No. 1641. This Order consolidates the many amendments to the Export of
Goods (Control) Order 1978 S1. 1978 No. 796, which itself consolidated amendmerits to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1979 SI. 1970 No. 1288.
38. Before the amending Order of 1979 any goods manufactured or produced less than 100
years before the date of export were not subject to export control. It seems implicit
that goods "manufactured or produced" includes works of art, though it is odd that the
current Order does not specifically so state since the earlier Orders of 1965 and 1970
made specific reference to works of art.
39. General Export Licences are not statutory instruments but are published by HMSO.
40. The present system of export control is based upon the recommendations of the
Waverley Committee, a committee appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
1950 under the chairmanship of Lord Waverley "to consider and advise on the policy
to be adopted by HM Government in controlling the export of works of art, books,
manuscripts, armour and antiques and to recommend what arrangements should be
made for the practical operation of policy." The Report was published by HMSO in
1952; it had recommended that the limitation of value should be £1,000 though the
Government commenced the present scheme with a value limitation of £500, which has
been increased by stages to the current £8,000 limit. An account of these developments
is given in the Appendix to the Notice to Exporters issued jointly by the Export
Licensing Branch of the Department of Trade and the Reviewing Committee on the
Export of Works of Art, dated 1980. This Appendix is reproduced as Appendix VI to
the 26th Report of the Reviewing Committee Crand. 8050 May 11, 1981.
41. This safeguard on the export of archaeological materials was first introduced in 1969,
but in practice very few applications for specific export licences have been made. In
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1978-79 only one application was made in respect of archaeological material valued at
£245, while in 1979-80 two applications were made in respect of archaeological
material of total value £445. It is therefore remarkable that in 1980-81 no less than
768 applications were made: Cinnd. 8515, Appendix V. No comment is inade on this in
the report.
Twenty-seventh Report of the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art
Cmnd. 8515 Appendix VI. Figures for the quantities of items not being paintings or
drawings are not available, albeit valuation figures of these items are provided.
Figures for 1980-81 are reproduced in Appendix VI but cover only the eight months
ending February 1981. Industrial action at the Government Computer Centre prevented
more up-to-date figures being compiled.

43.

Ibid. Appendix VI also provides figures for import over the same period. These figures
show that a rather larger number of paintings and drawings -were imported than
exported although aggregation of the valuation figures indicates that when considering
the balance of trade in all portable antiquities there is a consistent loss annually if
assessed purely in financial terms.

44.

Ibid. para. 26.

45.

Regard may also be had to the Customs and Excise Act 1952 s.56(2) which provides
that "Any person knowinvlv concerned in the exportation ....of any goods with intent
to evade any ....prohibition or restriction.., shall be liable to apenalty of three times the
value of the goods or £100 whichever is the greater and also to rriprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years, or both." Although s. 79(3) of the Act provides that exportation occurs at the time of departure of the conveyance it was held in Garrett v Arthur
Churchill (Glass), Ltd [1969] 2 All E.R. 1141 that on a charge under s. 56(2) a person
may be concerned with'the export of goods by doing things in advance of the time when
the conveyance departs. It was held in Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz 11982] 3 All
E.R. 432 that the words "shall be forfeited" in s. 12 of the (New Zealand) Historic
Articles Act 1962 meant that the title to goods illegally exported does not pass to the
Crown until after seizure by customs officers. In the court below Staughton J taking a
purposive view of the Act had held that they were forfeited as at the time of the illegal
export.

46.

See further: Simmonds (ed.) Encyclopedia of European Community Law, Vol. BII, para.
B10-085 ei seq. (Gormley) and Verloren van Themaat and Gormley (1981) 3 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 577. For the apparent adoption of the
discrimination criterion in respect of non-cornnionly organized sectors of the market see,
inter alia cases 15/79 P.B. Groenveld B. V v Produktschap voor Vee and Hees [1979] ECR
3409 and 155/80 Oebel 119811 ECR 1993.

47.

This discussion of the EEC points is contributed by Laurence Gormley, Barrister,
Lecturer in Law in the University of Liverpool

Town and Country Planning Act 1971. s. 114; Ancient Monuments and Archaeological
Areas Act 1979 s. 10.
49. Town and Country Planning Act 1971, s. 55, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological
Areas Act 1979, s. 2. The effect is that buildings of special architectural or historic interest
are listed pursuant to s.54 of the 1971 Act while ancient monuments of national importance are "scheduled" under the 1979 Act, formerly under the Ancient Monuments
Consolidation and Amendment Act 1913. The 1979 Act introduces a requirement to
obtain "scheduled monument consent" for alteration or destruction of a scheduled
monument which is similar to the present arrangements for obtaining listed building
consent for alteration or destruction of listed buildings, with the important differences
that scheduled rnonument consent is available only by application to the Secretary of
State.
50. This is despite the provision for minimum compensation on compulsory purchase under
s.116 of the 1971 Act when the owner has deliberately permitted the building to fall into
disrepair. The main expense is, of course, in restoration. It may be noted that the
National Heritage Act 1980 permits the Trustees to make advances by way of grant or
loan to the Secretary of State in exercise of his functions under s.5 of the Historic
Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953 (voluntary acquisitions) but not in respect
of compulsory acquisitions: s.3(6)(d). There are no statutory provisions which give
relief to public authorities wishing to restore a listed building.

48.

